Syracuse Scholar (1979-1991)
Volume 2
Issue 2 Syracuse Scholar Fall 1981

Article 9

1981

The Educator's Conscience
Manfred Stanley

Follow this and additional works at: https://surface.syr.edu/suscholar
Part of the Education Commons

Recommended Citation
Stanley, Manfred (1981) "The Educator's Conscience," Syracuse Scholar (1979-1991): Vol. 2 : Iss. 2 ,
Article 9.
Available at: https://surface.syr.edu/suscholar/vol2/iss2/9

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by SURFACE. It has been accepted for inclusion in Syracuse
Scholar (1979-1991) by an authorized editor of SURFACE. For more information, please contact surface@syr.edu.

Stanley: The Educator's Conscience

The Educator's
Conscience

Manfred Stanley

I

Manfred Stanley is Professor of
Sociology at Syracuse University and
holds a Ph.D . from New York University. He has been a Fellow of the National Endowment for the Humanities
and the National Institute of Mental
Health , a Research Associate of the
East African Institute of Social
Research in Uganda , and a Research
Associate at the Harvard University
Program on Technology and Society.
The editor of Social Development:
Cn"tical Perspectives, Dr. Stanley is also
author of The Technological Conscience ( 1978) and numerous articles
on sociology.

Published by SURFACE, 1981

n the New York Times of May 1, 1977 , the following quotation
appears. The author is a former teacher at Yale and Fordham and
.
has a Ph.D. in Russian history and literature . He is now an
executive in a management consulting firm and, in this passage, is
discussing how professors are being retrained for executive positions.
I think teaching is in many ways like selling. A good
teacher... can communicate enthusiasm and interest in the subject and. .. sell the students by relating it to their special needs.
And that is basically what we do when we sell a product.
Another executive, formerly a Ph .D. in English literature and
specialist in medieval drama, tells us in this same article that
it doesn't matter whether I'm analyzing a literary problem [in
Chaucer} or a marketing problem in Maidenform . The principles
are the same.
Irony flows easily in response to such justifications for abandoning the
office of educator for the life of a huckster. It is rather more difficult to
translate into some theoretical rigor one's feeling that persuasion in
education differs somehow from persuasion in the selling of brassieres.
The contrast seems to speak for itself; but is it only the vocational snob
who hears?
This essay begins with an effort to explore the modern educator's
conscience partially through my own experience with it. Although
materials from literature, philosophy, and the Bible are present, the
work is not a contribution to exegesis, literary criticism, or formal
philosophical analysis. It is a meditation on how educational pedagogy
differs from selling a commercial product. Reflected here are a method
for analyzing experience, a philosophy of education, a conception of
the limits of technology, and a view of some connections between
theory and narrative . In brief, I address three questions: Is there some
essential way the world appears to the educated consciousness? Is the
educated consciousness of any public benefit in a modern democracy?
What is the significance of these questions and their answers for
education policy?
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W

e must first ask whether there is a conscience unique to a
calling, a conscience more than that of the good man
in general. Can one be a good man and fail at one's calling as educator, as healer, as statesman? Such questions vex us. Aristotle wondered if the excellence of the good citizen was the same as that
of the morally virtuous man. He felt they were different. But the issue
seemed to give him pause-as it should, for our sense of the unity of
soul is at stake. Yet those former educators quoted in my opening
paragraph are surely not evil. There is, however, a failed conscience in
their utterance. Or is conscience of calling irrelevant now? Where does
one even begin with this tortured and trivialized and propagandized
question?
There are good reasons for assuming the irrelevance of conscience
today . Its authority has undergone some major humiliations in recent
centuries. Four humiliations in particular come to mind: the Copernican, in which the earth as human world is cast out of the center of
the cosmos; the Darwinian, in which the human world is degraded to
a stage in the evolution of the animal ; the sociological, in which conscience loses its mythical dimensions and is regarded as a mere
byproduct of social order; and the Freudian, in which so much of ordinary desire is unmasked as secret agent of the hidden beast in
human form .

1. Edward Engleberg, The Unknown
Distance: From Consciousness to Conscience, Goethe to Camus (Cambridge:

Harvard University Press, 1972),
p. 247.

At least a renovation of the concept of conscience is in order. We
must consider whether conscience is a censor of desire, a natural enemy
of gratification; whether it belongs to what Nietzsche condemned as
the history of slave morality; whether it is present always to convict us
of sin; whether it can create values rather than merely imitate then. In
the face of these possibilities, some make a fetish out of dramas of conscience. As Edward Engleberg has said, "To cling to irrational and indefensible ideals not for the sake of the ideals but for the sake of the
clinging has always been a presentiment of a declining age."l
I shall assume that secular modernists can speak of conscience,
though with difficulty and preferably without connotations of
repressive austerity and fetishistic self-sacrifice. Conscience is experienced as an internal tribunal; but it needs as a guide a moral
jurisprudence of practice, not a straitjacket of guilt. Conscience is a
form of consciousness; but it should be taken as the contradictions and
dialectics of means and ends, not as formulas of moral engineering.
What are the everyday experiences that stimulate the trials of conscience in the university at the present time? Almost everywhere in
America, university faculty manuals state the criteria for promotion
and tenure to be publications, teaching, and service. Conscience tells
us that to publish our research is to undermine the seductions of ignorance; to bring under the disciplines of truth seeking the diverse
structures of the world in which we live. To teach is to expose the
young to tradition and continuities . With regard to seroice, three
metaphors bear most upon the activities of educators: medicine, prophecy, and citizenship . The notion that philosophy relates to society
with something of the significance of medicine is as old as Plato . The
expectation that the educated mind should be fit to diagnose,
criticize , and prescribe for the human condition lends to education
something of the authority of prophecy. The exercise of skills necessary
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to manage a spiritually significant institution comprised of moral peers
requires the wisdom appropriate to the classical vision of citizenship .
In short, through study, writing, and speech, educators are expected
to challenge the young with preexisting traditions of identity; to give
form to the inchoate desires of consciousness; and to civilize through
example the standards of judgment that make up the forms of conscience. These expectations can be and are compromised by us all every
day.

I

t should be noted, however, that these compromises are contingent on the external conditions of contemporary educational
practice. They do not arise from the essence of the educator's
activity. Thus, in this everyday sense, "bad conscience" to an educator
seems proportionate to the degree to which he is not allowed to act out
the facets of his calling. There are many external conditions that call
forth such compromises today. In the path of those who would publish
on significant matters, there are the corrupting impediments of
unending careerism, irrational specialization, and the commodity
fetishism that besets the publishing industry. Teachers must contend
with the consumerism of students, the specious egalitarianism of
ideologues, and the illiteracy generated by public schools that have
lost all pride of excellence . Intelligent teachers are enticed by the
wealth of society into the status of technocratic conjurers reciting incantations of premature or inappropriate expertise.
Yet these corruptions can be corrected. They are not the necessary
ground of the educator's crisis of doubt. Nor can they explain the
definitive corruption of calling that characterizes the justifications of
career change in the quotations that open this paper. It is not consumerism, egalitarianism, capitalism, specialization, illiteracy, or
technicism that are ultimately responsible for the fact that everywhere
the true educators are the first to be censored, tortured, shot, and
silenced when a society decides the time has come for "order" to be
restored . Anyone who knows the history of churches, or of philosophy
from Plato to Rousseau, knows that it is not only modern grand inquisitors who resent the unfettered mind. What, then, distinguishes
the educator's calling? What is it that divides the practice of education
from other practices with which it is so often confused? What is the
nature of the commitment that, when honored, makes the educator a
necessary accomplice to suffering?
His commitment is to a thesis that cannot be proven: that the
achievement of fully human consciousness, though it may be a tragic
destiny , is the redeeming end of human evolution . To deny this thesis
is either to practice in bad faith or to substitute for education such activities as socialization, instruction, or indoctrination, which have
other ends. All three of these differ from education in that their
primary purpose is the reproduction of something in the psyche of the
student : for socialization, it is the authoritative order of society; for instruction, it is skills and information; for indoctrination, it is forms of
dogma . Education, in contrast, is inherently subversive of the tasks of
merely reproducing skills, information, and values. Educators do
make use of this material, of course-not for its own sake but for a permanently revolutionary conception: the exposure of the student to a
' 'conversation'' among those who risk much of their comfort to ques-
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tion the nature and point of existence itself. Because education is conscious and competent conversation about time and immortality; about
memory and testament; about all that makes us more than mere
bearers of skills, information, and dogma.
To see why this is a tragic destiny, one must inquire into the purpose of such a conversation. Yet the inquiry may be senseless . Conversation exists for no particular reason. It is of no direct use to anyone; it
breeds questions in place of what once seemed answers; it
troubles-indeed creates-conscience; left to itself, it can make
Hamlets of us all . Perhaps such conversation is unnatural, if by natural
one means performing only those functions which realize our finite
and prudential sociobiological interests. Our fate is dominated by the
evolving social norms and codes that aid our adjustment to our bodies.
Why , then, does humankind invent the soul and send it forth in frail
vessels of consciousness toward uncharted possibilities? Perhaps simply
because consciousness, once awakened, scorns its own innocence; once
infinity is imagined, all finitude becomes intolerable.

T

2. All quotes from Lord Byron's Cain
are from The Works of Lord Byron
(Leipzig: Bernh. Tauchnitz Jun.,
1842) , 4:207 - 272.

he origins and forms of conscience are often best discerned
in narratives that illuminate the essence of a social practice.
The paradigm story of education in which the conscience of
this practice is depicted is the Book of Genesis. The mythic question
for educators seems to be this: Why did a supreme and omniscient deity, knowing what would follow, place the tree of knowledge in Eden,
yet forbid Adam to eat of its fruit? To explore this, let us make use of
Cain, one of Lord Byron's lesser known verse plays, which addre~ses
this question directly and therefore has much to say to educators. After
Lucifer has revealed to Cain all that was, is, and ever shall be, Byron
has Cain say this to Abel:
The dead
The immortal, the unbounded, the omnipotent,
The overpowering mysteries of spaceThe innumerable worlds that were and areA whirlwind of such overwhelming things,
Suns, moons, and earths, upon their loud-voiced spheres
Singing in thunder round me, as have made me
Unfit for mortal converse: leave me, Abel. 2
The fratricide follows almost inevitably when Abel tries to force Cain
to worship a God whom Cain has come to despise because he is inscrutable and arbitrary . Significantly, Byron presents Lucifer as the
pure educator, undivided by ambivalence about absolute consciousness as good or evil.
Lucifer:
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I tempt none,
Save with the truth: was not the tree, the tree
of knowledge? and was not the tree of ltfe
Sttfl fruitful? Did I bid her pluck them not?
Did I plant things prohibited within
the reach of beings innocent, and curious
By their innocence? I would have made ye
Gods: and even He who thrust ye forth, so thrust ye
Because ''ye should not eat the fruits of ltfe,
And become gods as we . '' Were those his words?
4
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Cain:

They were, as I have heard from those who heard
them,
In thunder.

Then who was the demon? He
Who would not let ye live, or he who would have
made ye live for ever in the joy
And power of knowledge?
Lucifer is merciless. He is consciousness untempered by compassion for
the ignorance which at least makes men fit for ''mortal converse.'' But
he is also shrewd, for he presents God as driven by jealousy, as ruler of
a kingdom of secrets he would not share.
For Byron's Lucifer, what ultimately drives God to creation is no
motive of good or evil. It is infinite loneliness, the corollary of infinite
consciOusness.
He is great...
But, in his greatness, is no happier than
We in our conflict! Goodness would not make
Evil; and what else hath he made? But let him
Sit on his vast and solitary throne,
Creating worlds, to make eternity
Less burthensome to his immense existence
And unparticipated solitude;
Let him crowd orb on orb: he is alone
Indefinite, indissoluble tyrant;
Could he but crush himself, 't were the best boon
He ever granted: but let him reign on,
And multiply himself in misery.
Spirits and Men, at least we sympathizeAnd, suffering in concert, make our pangs
Innumerable, more endurable
By the unbounded sympathy of all
With all! But He! so wretched in his height,
So restless in his wretchedness, must stzll
Create, and re-createTo quell this infinite loneliness, it would seem that God must cease to
be omniscient and enter into true community with other gods, thereby
ceasing to be the One God; or he must create the perpetual student
destined to converse respectfully in perpetual worship and perpetual
pain with his maker about the nature of existence. Is there, in this narrative of God as maker, a paradigm for understanding man as mentor?
Three themes in this play offer themselves for reflection: mixed
motives, loss of innocence, and exile.
1. Mixed motives. God's motives are mixed. Loneliness, jealousy,
compassion, and love all seem present in Eden. In Jewish tradition,
Elie Wiesel tells us, Adam was made a fit companion for God. But the
tradition also has it that Adam was bored (and boring?) in paradise.
Since he had the universe to himself, he desired nothing,
thought of nothing and nobody. Happy, content, he seems
singularly uninteresting before his downfall.... One pictures his
lzfe as drab, devoid of expectation, of stimulation. 3
Surely this cannot be ennui, the boredom of decadence, of worldweariness. Not yet. Rather it is the boredom of mere cleverness; of

Lucifer:
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3. Elie Wiesel, Messengers of God (New
York: Random House, 1976), p. 11.
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4. Paul Ricoeur, The Symbolism of
E11il (Boston: Beacon Press, 1967), p .
250 .

5. Gen. 3:22-23.

6. Ricoeur , Symbolism of E11il.

7. Giovanni Pico della Mirandola, Ora·
tion on the Dignity of Man (Chicago:
Regnery/Gateway, 1956), pp . 7-8 .

those without history and the power to make it . In his analysis of the
Adamic myth, Paul Ricoeur reminds us of the triviality of interdictions
against eating fruit, however magically endowed with power. By signifying the fruit as the fruit of the tree of knowledge, however, magic is
eliminated from the issue altogether and things are trivial no longer.
"What is forbidden" says Ricoeur, "is not this or that, but a state of
autonomy which would make man the creator of the distinction between good and evil." 4

A

n omniscient God knows the stakes and the outcome of such
a situation. After clothing Adam's nakedness, and before
expelling him from Eden, God says:
Behold, the man is become as one ofus, to know good and evil:
and now, lest he put forth his hand, and take also of the tree of
life, and eat, and live forever: Therefore the Lord God sent him
forth from the garden of Eden, to tzll the ground from whence
he was taken. 5
Thus we may say with Ricoeur, "There begins an irreversible adventure, a crisis in the becoming of man, which will not reach its denouement until the final process of justification."6
We do not see in the God of Genesis, as we do in Byron's Lucifer, a
deity who would be pure educator. What we do see are many
possibilities: an infinite I in need of a thou, a jealous master, a fearful
parent, a perpetual teacher with a precocious pupil. At least, so the
story goes, we have a God who offers man the possibility of education
and provides him the free will with which to make the choice . Should
the offer be accepted, things do seem arranged to lighten God 's complicity in the consequences, whatever his motive .
Nothing here is unrecognizable by the educator's conscience. As
socializer, instructor, and indoctrinator, the educator can say: Hearken
to the laws of the order that gave you birth; heed and prosper. Yet,
what mortal does not tremble when the mere reproduction of ideas
ceases and a deeper questioning begins; when teacher says to pupil
what Pico della Mirandola said in 1487 through the voice of Eden's
God :
We have given you, Oh Adam, no visage proper to yourself, nor
any endowment properly your own, in order that whatever
place, whatever form, whatever gifts you may, with premeditation, select, these same you may have and possess through your
own judgment and decision . The nature ofall other creatures is
defined and restricted within laws which We have laid down;
you, by contrast, impeded by no such restrictions, may, by your
own free will, to whose custody We have assigned you, trace for
yourselfthe lineaments ofyour own nature. I have placed you at
the very center ofthe world, so that from that vantage point you
may with greater ease glance round about you on all that the
world contains. We have made you a creature neither of heaven
nor of earth, neither mortal nor immortal, in order that you
may, as the free and proud shaper of your own being, fashion
yourself in the form you may prefer. It wzll be in your power to
descend to the lower, brutish forms of life; you wzll be able,
through your own decision, to rise again to the superior orders
whose lzfe is divine . 7
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Who dares take full responsibility for saying that? We all hedge, God
on down.
2. Loss of innocence. What sort of innocence was lost with Adam's
Fall? We cannot put it quite that way , I think. Innocence may be the
negation of a malaise in which we feel trapped . There is a state of innocence appropriate to every malady of the spirit that we can put into
words . First there is a Fall, only then an Eden. ' 'But of the tree of the
knowledge of good and evil, thou shalt not eat of of it: for in the day
that thou eatest thereof thou shalt surely die."8 The serpent, of
course, assures Eve she will not die. "For God doth know that in the
day ye eat thereof, then your eyes shall be opened, and ye shall be as
gods knowing good and evil. "9 Are the two statements incompatible?
When is it death to open one's eyes? "And the eyes of them both were
opened, and they knew that they were naked .... " 10
Now that we are at last emerging from sexual fetishism in the West,
it has become possible to understand the fall into clothing as
something other than God 's animosity toward pornography. " Insofar
as clothes imply social estrangement or differentiation by status,''
Kenneth Burke reminds us, as would all sociologists, ''they are by the
same token a kind of 'fall.' In themselves they are at odds with the
natural order; yet nakedness is at odds with the order of our 'second
nature ." ' What is this second nature into which we have fallen? It is,
of course, civil order-social life. Clothes signify the cancellation of
that primordial equality, symbolized by nakedness, and its replacement by the hierarchical order or rank and power. (The first example
of the latter was God's interdiction of the fruit; only when violated
was the interdiction revealed for what it truly was-the imposition of
authority.) Clothes also symbolize the vanity, the dissimulations, the
proprieties, and the self-aggrandizement which Rousseau so bitterly
depicts as the price of the human estate .

8. Gen . 2:17.

9. Gen. 3:4-5 .
10. Gen. 3:7 .

T

hese are the roots of evil, generated not by willful sin or
malign demons but by the necessary complicity of all in the
consequences of social order. How is this tree different from
all other trees in the garden, since it looks equally pleasant, though its
fruit be condemned? To know, one must eat and find out. The loss of
innocence, then, is a consequence not of a magical property of the
fruit but of the fact of its prohibition . The knowledge of rules constitutes the fall from innocence . Without limits there is no freedom
because there is no differentiation. If there is no differentiation, there
can be no I and no thou and no it. Whatever other motives God had,
he forbade that the fruit be eaten so as to teach man that he is not
God . The loss of innocence is the birth of the human condition-the
consciousness that one is forever suspended between finitude and infinitude, between temporality and omniscience, and between animality and divinity. Man does not sin because he is free. He is free because
he dramatizes some rules as capable of being sinned against. The Fall
of Adam, in which we participate whenever his story engages our emotions, is the mythic dramatization of human autonomy. The loss of innoncence symbolizes our ambivalence about its price.
We must ask whether any of this is recognizable by the educator's
conscience, and whether any innocence is sacrificed to education. Why
is it part of the conventional wisdom that only those with toleration for
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ambiguity are safely fit to be educated? It is because to be educated is
to be exposed, like Byron's Cain, to the endless disjunctions between
intentions, actions, and consequences that constitute the injustice of
all things as they appear in narrative time. To be educated is to know
infinite desire-for justice, life, love, fulfillment-while comprehending the finitudes of all hope and all effort. Magic is the annihilation of
these disjunctions, the pseudo-reconciliation of wish and fulfillment ;
that is why so many believe in it. Education subverts magic. The
disciplines of reason depose our wishes from the center of things to the
humbler status of mere facts to be contemplated as any others.
3. Exzle. This third theme suggested by Byron's Cain concerns
Adam's departure from Eden. He is cast out with cherubim and flaming sword barring any return. The story does not mention if Adam
argued his right to stay. Would be have wanted to if the terms of exile
were less harsh? It is credible to doubt it. Eden may not be the same
when one has eaten of the tree of knowledge . Paradise without innocence is a garden in which nothing happens, a diorama in God's
museum of creation, a climate-controlled bore outside of time.
Because there had been no history to induce cynical withdrawal from
the temptations of experience, Adam might well have looked about
him with a newly jaundiced eye . The threatening demeanor of God
confuses things. Had God offered forgiveness and a renewed lease, we
might have found Adam departing nonetheless, exiled not by God
but by the necessary psychology of consciousness itself. There is a sense
in which it can be said that the first eating of the fruit of knowledge is
not in itself a free act of choice but rather the act by which, through its
consequences, all freedom of choice is constituted. In order to weigh
choices, one must know something, be able to look fore and aft in
time, feel vicariously the contours of experience . John Stuart Mill put
the matter aptly:
It is better to be a human being dissatisfied than a pig satisfied;
better to be Socrates dissatisfied than a fool satisfied. And zf the
fool or the pig is of contrary opinion, it is because they only
know their side of the question. The other party to the comparison knows both sides.
If so, Eden could suddenly appear as fit for only pigs and fools, not
men of knowledge.
Surely this makes sense to the educator's conscience . The educated
soul is cast out of society's comforting innocence-the innocence of
the socializer's mystifications, false histories, magic, and propaganda
that reconcile the unreconcilable and tempt the neophyte with the certitude that what is here and now is of the eternal order of things. The
educated soul is exiled into time to till the soil of history and eat of its
fruits in hope and faith, while suffering the burdens of doubt.

W

hat is it, then, that we really mean by a failure in the
educator's conscience of calling: vulgarity? immorality?
greed? corruption? I think not . Should we expect of
ourselves the rectitude of God? Failure of nerve, I suspect, is at the
heart of the strange quotations that provide occasion for these reflections; they betray a sense of futility, defrocked aspirations, self-doubt,
and loss of pride in an age of failed ideas. For a great many people , no
disillusionment seems quite so secretly intense as that connected with
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the university. The ivory tower is symbol of scorn on the surface only.
But under this surface it symbolizes a monastery, a retreat in which
people expect to find (even if they do not seek) realities beneath mere
appearances.
The poignancy of the ivory-tower metaphor is peculiarly modern.
There has been a sharp change between the classical view and the
modern view of education's benefits, a change that has affected the
conception of educational experience as such. This cultural change in
the meaning of education accounts for the ungrounded loneliness in
the model of the educated consciousness presented in this article. The
change I am referring to is the transformation of philosophy's central
project, a change stemming from Descartes, in which the confident
search for the structure of the Real (metaphysics) is replaced by the
skeptical search for minimally secure foundations of any knowledge
claims whatever (epistemology).
It is necessary at this point to remind ourselves quite candidly how
much the modern view implicit in this essay departs from the classical
view (Plato to Jefferson) regarding the psychic benefits and costs of
education to individual and public. In the classical view, to simplify
greatly, benefits outweighed costs. Education was rooted in the conviction that a knowable distinction exists between appearance and reality,
the clarification of which is the time-honored task of philosophical
metaphysics.
Modern philosophy since Descartes has found this assumption increasingly problematic. Education under these conditions was considered intrinsically nihilistic, an endless round of demystification to
no purpose, ungrounded in any resting place of final understanding.
Education became simply another ride in the Disneyland that is increasingly the metaphor for modern ideals of consumer existence. If
education is, in the modern view, the pointless cultivation of mind,
why should any regime tolerate its corrosive power to subvert all ''noble lies" (Plato's conception of socially useful myths)? This essay's
model of the educated person, it must be admitted, is virtually Nietzschian : one who can live nobly in the shadow of a possibly nihilistic
but supremely self-aware consciousness. It may be conceded that some
are born to the vocation of education and its terrors, even in the
modern form of that vocation. But are they like yesterday's monks and
mystics-to be tolerated but hardly acceptable as models, for the
yeomanry, of the public benefits of education? The question before us
is the fate of the conviction that education is redemptive for
democracy. In place of this conviction we must pose questions: Is
democracy incompatible with education? Is democracy compatible
with education? Is education redemptive (much less necessary) for
democracy? (These are three quite distinctive questions. An answer to
one does not provide for the others .)
There is much evidence from history and social science that
democracy is incompatible with education. Educational ideals are
endlessly sabotaged and subverted by the unintended effects of social
organization (e.g., social-class interests, bureaucratic distortions, communication pathologies). The evolutionary demands of social control
repeatedly supersede the cultural ideals of education. Finally, educational philosophers from Plato to Ortega y Gasset have noted that the
democratization of culture seems to generate vulgarization.
Published by SURFACE, 1981
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A

s to our second question, whether there is any notable compatibility between democracy and education: democracies
stress the rapid circulation of elites (e.g., through the spread of
economic opportunity, social mobility, political representation of
plural constituencies). As efficient circulatory systems for ideas,
talents, and innovations, democracies provide more protection than
do other regimes against elite closure-the hardening of cultural and
social arteries that brings about political cardiac arrest.
This leaves us with the third and philosophically most crucial question: Does education have any public benefits that seem at all redemptive (much less necessary) for democracy? If the answer is negative,
then further pursuit of the first two questions is pointless. It is not
necessary to assume that education is a vocation for everyone in order
to argue that it is redemptive for a democracy. But we must establish
that to a certain common degree all citizens should be seriously exposed to education; we must state the uniform public benefit of education in a democracy. The general trend toward the technicization of
culture, language, and psyche is the major present threat to
democratic ideals. Technicism involves an uncritical abdication of personal responsibility over language by way of premature acceptance of
expertise claims; it is a blindness toward the logical continuities between expert and everyday judgments. Modern complex societies
generate many technicist trends. Eventually technicist culture is likely
to facilitate a mystifying authority language resting on metaphors
derived from technology and engineering. The logic of this symbolic
edifice, accessible only to the computer-trained elect, would generate
the concepts, judgments, and decisions that control the lives of
populations-a situation amounting to subjugation by metaphor.
In the face of this threat to all classically conceived connections between personal rationality and democratic political culture, only
education stands as a barrier. If education is to play this redemptive
role, however, it cannot do it under false pretenses. It cannot return to
any form of the Platonic status of midwife to philosopher-kings. Nor
should education be reduced to a euphemism for other forms of
pedagogy whose ends are merely to reproduce some form of the status
quo. Ironically, modern democracy, to be redeemed from technicist
mystiques, may require a form of mind trained into ironic distance
from all forms of mystification, even the noble lies of democracy itself.
Education can no longer, with integrity, ratify democracy by articulating to its citizens the metaphysics of the Real or the structures of
the self-evident. But it can aspire to be a critique of signification as
such, a form of elite literacy that redeems democracy by combining
potentially nihilist suspicion with a dignified respect for all forms of
symbolization-a power in which all persons participate as speakers
and interpreters. This aspiration would make of education a critical
process that never rests, but not one without redemptive byproducts.
If it cannot mediate any final revelation, it can at least demystify
tyrannies both physical and symbolic.

A

s with all visions, this view of education has its noble and base
versions. The educated consciousness, as depicted here in its
modern terms, has not of necessity a conscience . As every lover
of conversation knows, the ironic critic-as-destroyer is a real and often
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brilliant social type . The crafted intellect can be an instrument of
death. Education alone cannot produce the courage to act beyond the
immediate guarantees of reason; what is needed is a form of courage
necessary for the making of history. With this point, we come full circle to the classic philosophers who, through inquiry into the habits of
character, sought to comprehend how contemplation and action
might be reconcilable as human ends . Modern educational policy
anlaysis needs to have this ancient concern rephrased in contemporary
terminology.
In concluding, I will let another voice summarize the spirit of these
reflections:
As civzlized beings, we are the inhen.tors, neither of an inquiry
about ourselves and the world, nor of an accumulating body of
information, but of a conversation, begun in the pn·m eval
forests and extended and made more articulate in the course of
centunes. It is a conversation which goes on both in public and
within each of ourselves. Education, properly speaking, is an initiation into the skill and partnership of this conversation in
which we learn to recognize the voices, to distinguish the proper
occasions of utterance, and in which we acquire the intellectual
and moral habits appropnate to conversation. And it is this conversation which, in the end, gives place and character to every
human activity and utterance.ll
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